What Philosophy Does to the Mind

> The ideal aim of philosophizing is to become reflectively at home in the full complexity of the multi-dimensional conceptual system in terms of which we suffer, think, and act. I say 'reflectively', because there is a sense in which, by the sheer fact of leading an unexamined, but conventionally satisfying life, we are at home in this complexity. It is not until we have eaten the apple with which the serpent philosopher tempts us, that we begin to stumble on the familiar and to feel that haunting sense of alienation which is treasured by each new generation as its unique possession. This alienation, this gap between oneself and one's world, can only be resolved by eating the apple to the core; for after the first bite there is no return to innocence. There are many anodynes, but only one cure. We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize. (Wilfred Sellars, *The Structure of Knowledge*)

Part I.

Philosophy's first gesture, pace Sellars, is to disturb the apparent natural equilibrial balance between the subject and the world and by doing so, bringing about the possibility of differentiating reality from the world of appearances, thought from the thing. Effectuated by the *epistemic polarization* of the mind and the world, this differentiation is an initial step for a nontrivial and piecemeal synthesis between reality and appearances. But it is important to note that this synthesis cannot be misconstrued as the restoration of the gap between the two to a state prior to perturbing the peace of the mind and the world. It is this agitation that marks the territory of knowledge and enables the synthetic activities of cognitive inquiry which are distinguished by the ever-growing demands of thought. For this reason, this synthesis is fundamentally irreconcilable with the cognitive idleness of gnosis and its ready-made solutions for generating the knowledge of the real.

By driving a wedge between the mind and the world—understood as the ratio of epistemic separation cum ontological correspondence—philosophy forever departs from the domain of gnosis where the knowledge of the world is given in the subject of thought or experience. Philosophy makes this gesture in order to construct itself a history, rather than an essential nature plagued by the knowledge of the given or the laws of the divine. However, in fashioning its own escape from the clutches of theology and gnosis by injecting disequilibrium into the landscape of thought, philosophy makes an important contribution to the history of thought whose consequences and ambitions far exceed the scope of philosophy itself. The basic point of this presentation is that by disturbing the equilibrium between the mind and the world,

philosophy turns itself into the single most consequential event in the history of the mind and as it shall be argued, the history of artificial general intelligence.

The separation of reality from appearances, the disturbance of the equilibrium between the mind and the world has its first impacts on the central concerns of philosophy, namely, truth and goodness. If knowledge of the world is no longer directly or immediately given in the mind, then it means that truths are not a priori available to us either. The same can be said about goodness. We no longer enjoy an immediate access to the highest good and therefore goodness becomes a matter of piecewise construction. Rather than becoming an impediment and a source of crisis, this alienation from the comforting abode of the given truth and the original good becomes a condition of enablement. This is the very meaning of philosophy as a discipline that continuously works under the condition of an enabling alienation.

Driven by an emancipative alienation, philosophy operates as the combined force of wisdoms—theoretical and practical—whose duty is to approach truth and goodness in a gradualist fashion. This gradual and open-ended approach concomitant with the commitment to truth and goodness is the beginning of the game of navigation. But this is a game solely in the sense of conforming to rule-based practices which are error-tolerant and open to collective manipulation, that is to say social revision and construction.

Within the game of navigation, truth is no longer treated as canonical. Instead it is approached as *making sense of* what it means to *take something as true* and what it means to *make it true*, separately and in relation to one another. The approach to goodness, on the other hand, is realized as expanding the scope of navigation of what it means to take something as true and what it means to make it true. That is to say, goodness is understood as the maintaining and enhancement of freedom of understanding and action, their different options, future opportunities, alternative paths, possibilities of reinforcement and integration. To put it shortly, the approach to truth and goodness is enacted as a game of navigation seeded by philosophy's gesture to permanently disturb the equilibrium between the mind and the world.

Once a wedge is driven between the mind and the world, truth and goodness are no longer immediately given to the subject. The possibility of knowledge is the effect of planting this point of disequilibrium between the mind and the world and the perpetual agitation in thought resulted from this disturbance. Without this state of agitation, there is no possibility of qualitative organization of information out of the homogenous information space, given the fact that the qualitative organization of information is necessary for conception and knowledge-production. It is the introduction of the point of disequilibrium between the mind and the world that as Gilles Chatelet notes opens a horizon in the landscape of thought, highlighting transits and ramifying paths—between appearances and reality, the subject and the world—otherwise impossible to recognize from the perspective of an unperturbed landscape. "The horizon," Chatelet suggests "opens a field, a continuum of degrees, between the illusion of a transparent reading and what looks as if it will never be within reach because it maintains all these 'reaches'." (Chatelet, *The Stake of the Mobile*) In short, the horizon is the terrain of knowledge that systematically converts all degrees and "choices of disequilibrium" (ibid) generated by the tension between

appearances and reality, the mind and the world into opportunities of navigation. These ramifying paths or transits transform the terrain knowledge into a multipathic structure where the principle of uniqueness of path is dissolved. Knowing becomes a matter of qualitatively organizing a homogenous informational landscape by moving from one path to another, investigating transits and obstructions by taking determinate stances or orientations, by inferentially articulating concept-spaces and navigating different pathways. The uniqueness of path or unipathicity as we shall discuss later is a disabling condition for knowledge and must be actively forestalled.

From this point onward, since truth and goodness are not wholly within our reach, they must be approached through a gradual navigation comprised of cognitive and social-based practices, that is practices required to approach truth (categorized under theoretical reason) and practices required to approach goodness (categorized under practical reason). Since for philosophy the mind is distinguished by its activities with regard to truth and goodness, engaging in the game of navigation counts as reenacting the mind itself, a practical simulation if not the very reconstruction of it. In other words, if what the mind does is what the mind is, and if for philosophy the activities of the mind are characterized as its capacities to approach truth and goodness through engaging in rule-based practices then the game of navigation is the functional realization of the mind outside of its familiar natural habitat (or the order of 'is'). In Heideggerian terms, special performances of the mind can be treated as 'in-whiches' (*das Wobei*) or performances *in which* the mind is whatever it is or would be. Correspondingly, any class of in-which can be fulfilled by its manipulable by-and-toward-whiches (*das Womit* and *das Wozu*) or simply, the role it plays and orientations it assumes in a functional organization. Within this ingenious formulation lies the nucleus of philosophy's pragmatist functionalist approach to the mind highlighted by the likes of Confucius and Socrates to Plato to Seneca, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Zongsan, Sellars and Brandom.

If the mind is the functional organization of a specific set of activities, then we can understand the mind as a set of practices whose elaboration count as the realization of these activities and thereby, the realization of the meaning of the mind. In other words, what should we *do* in order to count as realizing the mind or those activities which define it? This is a basis for understanding the mind in terms of its practical decomposability into a set of practices or doings. Conducting these practices under the constraints of modes of organization implicit to them count as understanding the meaning of the mind but also constructing it.

Therefore, the pragmatic functionalist understanding of the mind—itself a fruit of disturbing the equilibrium or the informational homogeneity between the mind and the world—is a historical moment in the evolution of the mind. But evolution in what sense? In the sense that the pragmatic functionalist realization of the mind (the understanding of its meaning, *meaning through use or practices*) coincides with the artificial realization of the mind (or the construction of its functional space by entirely different sets of realizers). For philosophy, the unity of both—that is the understanding of the meaning of the mind and its artificial realization—forms the project of self-realization through which the mind constitutes its own history and evolves in accordance with it. The artificial, which is to say, the mind realized by the artifactual is

reintegrated into reality of the mind as that which has no nature but only histories. Its meaning cannot be traced back to an original foundation or an inherent nature, because it is constituted by practices which determine it and are themselves susceptible to modification.

As the disequilibrium between the mind and the world seeds the game of navigation, the possibilities of the understanding and the realization of the mind begin to change and expand according to the scope and the complexity of navigation. The understanding of the mind can be enriched by new practices whose elaboration count as realizing the meaning of the mind. In the same vein, the mind can be functionally realized in broader contexts by different sets of realizing practices. In the context of philosophy's approach to truth and goodness, the evolution of the mind—in the sense of its multiple and multi-modal realizability—can be expanded and enhanced by expanding and enhancing its navigational approaches to truth and goodness.[1]

If the philosophy's model of mind is distinguished by its practical abilities to approach truth and goodness, then the diversification of the space of navigation by diversifying and upgrading the armamentaria or toolboxes of epistemic and socio-political practices is the first step in expanding the evolution of the mind in the above sense. Without this diversification and upgrading of practices implicit to truth and goodness (namely, epistemic and socio-political practices), the meaning of the mind remains more or less fixed and its evolution limited. But why does the determination of the meaning of the mind in terms of practices which constitute its activities imply an expanded evolution of the mind? To rephrase the question, why does understanding and realization of the mind in terms of its practical rather than algorithmic decomposability not only avoid limiting the evolution of the mind but also broaden the scope of its evolution? Because practices whose elaboration count as fulfilling the activities the mind can be collectively modified or upgraded, they are distinguished by their social manipulability and by their capacity to bootstrap complex abilities out of primitive abilities. This is what sets apart philosophy's thesis regarding algorithmic practical decomposability of the mind from the algorithmic logical decomposability of the mind espoused by symbolic AI for which thought-parcels are ideal logical objects and hence, open to identical algorithmic iterations. The characterization of the mind as a practical object rather than an ideal one essentially amounts to the identification of mind as a practical project, because the domain of practices is integrative and possesses a commitive dimension, it is open to social construction and capable of individuating collective configurations.

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[1] According to the *multiple realizability thesis*, the realization of a function can be satisfied by different sets of realizing properties, individuating powers and activities. Therefore, the function can be realized in different environments outside of its natural habitat by different realizers. Multiple realizability usually comes in strong and constrained varieties. The strong version does not impose any material or organizational constraints on the realizability of a specific function, therefore the function is taken to be realizable in infinite ways or implementable in infinite or numerous substrates. The constrained variety, however, sees the conditions required for the realizability of a function through a deep or hierarchical model comprised of different explanatory levels and qualitatively different realizer properties which impose their respective constraints on the realization of the function. Accordingly, the criteria for the realization of a function are characterized as dimensionally varied and multiply constrained.

In orienting the mind toward truth and goodness, philosophy forces the mind to enter the game of navigation and develop a distinct game-bias or the attitude of being true to the game. This is but the rational compulsion necessary to navigate the space of commitments to truth and goodness through conforming to error-tolerant and revisionary rules of theoretical and practical reasoning. While the navigation space of epistemic practices is the space of knowledge, for socio-political practices, the navigation space is that of ethics and politics. Both the edifice of knowledge and the ethico-political complex are systems of navigation conforming to rules specific to their domains, one a system for conforming to the rules of navigation over concepts as fine-grained mappings of reality, the other a system for conforming to the social sphere of norms with regard to ethico-political commitments and actions. Philosophy perceives both as two sides of the same navigational system. The fusion of these two sides in accordance with their respective know-hows is the very aim of philosophy as a universalizing operator of truth-oriented and goodness-oriented practices.

It is the integration of epistemic and socio-politico practices that has the key to the evolution of the mind as a practical project rather than a theoretical or logical object. If for philosophy the functional account of the mind is grasped in terms of its practical decomposability into both truth-oriented and goodness-oriented practices, then the realization of the mind becomes a matter of unifying theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning, epistemic practices and social practices. However, this integration is impossible without having a 'rule-following' behavior as a form of rational compulsion. There is basically no conceptual procedure and no determinate commitment to conceptual content as the requirement for action without an inferential account of reason. Any account of navigation in the space of concept requires inferences to articulate conceptual content and work out the navigational links between concepts. Commitment to the concept whether as a unit of knowledge or a determinate content for action without an inferentialist account of reason is a fundamentally impotent. It is not a commitment at all. Because lacking this rational compulsion or compliance to the space of rules that we ourselves have made binding, neither the space of the concept nor the space of socio-political collectivity can be navigated. It is in this sense that the game of navigation is first of all what Robert Brandom calls a "rational system of commitments" (Brandom, *Between Saying and Doing*).

Any orientation, stance or move in the game of navigation is counted as a commitment. Insofar as the game of navigation consists of two theoretical and practical sides, commitments fall under two general categories of theoretical and practical commitments. To make a commitment is to endorse its content, but to endorse the content of a theoretical or practical commitment (be it assertional, referential, inferential, cognitive or practical) is to unpack or practically elaborate that content. In order to elaborate the content of a commitment, one must examine what other commitments it leads to, *what else*, what other collateral commitments and entitlements are its ramifications. Taking the ramified paths of a commitment—i.e. the consequent commitments one implicitly undertake by endorsing a commitment—and to deprive oneself of incompatible commitments by updating, revising or if needed abandoning commitments make up the rational compulsion that characterizes the system of commitments as a navigational system. To

rationally respond to the force of one's commitment is to uproot oneself according to demands of its ramifying paths or revisionary outcomes.

By turning the game of navigation into a system of commitments, philosophy gauges any choice of disequilibrium whether in the realm of thought or action by treating it as a commitment that must be taken to its far-reaching conclusions, its ramifying paths unpacked and navigated. Since philosophy sees any cognitive or practical commitment from the perspective of its collateral commitments and entitlements, it locates any address or commitmental position one has endorsed in the past or is endorsing in the present from the perspective of its ramifying paths or future destinations. Accordingly, to take a stance in the game of navigation is to be prepared to revise the current position and the past itinerary by navigating ramified paths which express the meaning of taking that stance. These are transits and obstructions which express the possibility a commitment or lack thereof. A strong version of the game of navigation, accordingly, should be able to elaborate the permissibility dimension of transits and obstructions through deontic notions of permission and obligation.

As a discipline that closely follows the procedure of practical and cognitive commitment-making as a form of navigation, philosophy constructs a mind in which rational compulsion supplants natural impulsion. Under this rational compulsion—the compulsion to navigate—mind gains the propensity to revise its abilities and thereby, revising what it is and how it can be realized. Philosophy defines the meaning of the mind in terms of its activities in making and tracking commitments. But under the rational compulsion, every commitment ramifies into other commitments which simultaneously revise the initial commitment and demand new abilities and activities in order for them to be further elaborated. Therefore, the mind that philosophy envisions is a mind that self-constitutes its history. This is the beginning of a model of the mind as that which realizes itself not in virtue of where it has come from or what it currently is but in spite of them. In other words, this is the expression of the mind as what has a self-constituting history, namely, the ability to realize and define itself through what currently does not constitute it.

Realizing itself through the artificial by swapping its natural constitution or biological organization with other material or, as it will be argued, social organizations is a central aspect of the mind. Being artificial, or more precisely, expressing itself via the artifactual is the very meaning of the mind as that which has a history rather than an essential nature. To have a history is to have the possibility of being artificial—that is to say, expressing yourself not by way of what is naturally given to you but by way of what you yourself can make and organize. Denouncing this history is the same as rejecting freedom in all its forms. Denying the artificial truth of the mind and refusing to take this truth to its ultimate conclusions is to antagonize the *history* of the mind, and therefore to be an enemy of thought.

By reinventing the history of the mind as a system of navigation that is continuously being updated under the weight of its ramifying paths, philosophy presents a model of the mind that is at once exploratory and revisionary. The designated introduction of instability to the equilibrial balance of the mind and the world is the constitutive gesture of knowledge as a system that

distinguish reality from appearances and decants knowing from the obvious or any account of the given. Because hidden under such disguises as the 'foundation', 'what appears to be the case' or generally under the heading of '*what we already know*', the obvious poses itself as the most disabling condition for the production of knowledge and the paradigm of navigation.

However, the separation of reality from the world of appearances is not a sufficient condition for the realization of the mind as a project. Nor is it adequate for the liberation of philosophy from the domination of theology and gnosis. Because the myth of the given and the insidious presence of the obvious under the disguise of what we already know can appear even in the absence of any theology or gnosis. In order to eradicate the more harmful residues of the epistemic given concealed in the system of navigation or the structure of knowledge itself, philosophy arms itself with a protocol far more sophisticated than its epistemic wedge picked up and sharpened by science. This is the principle of deep skepticism that as we shall see makes the corrosive truth of philosophy.

Part II.

Philosophy is archenemy of the obvious. Even though philosophy frequently falls in the trap of the obvious, it has the habit of always coming back to exact a revenge on what is obvious in a manner and the scale not dissimilar to the epic culmination of Jacobean revenge dramas. Unlike any other thought discipline known to man, philosophy never closes the circle of its revenge. It is characterized by its perpetual refusal to put any matter to rest. This absolute recalcitrance bespeaks of the corrosive blood that runs through the body of philosophy, which is that of the principle of deep skepticism: *Knowledge must be suspicious of what it already knows. To know more is to believe less, the more we know the less should we believe in what we know.* Because if the task of belief is to turn the accumulated knowledge into a regulative foundation and respectively, a matter of faith then the progress of knowledge is by definition retroactively aborted. For how can one acquire new knowledge if the knowledge that has already been accumulated is treated as the locus of truth. If the site of truth is in what has already taken place, then knowledge only exhibits the truth-preservation of classical qua logical rationality thus violating the first objective of knowledge which is that 'one knows because one does not know.' But 'to know' is to preserve and mitigate ignorance at the same time, a dual task whose logical structure is at odds with the monotonicity of truth-preservation.

The monotonic entailment of truth-preservation functions precisely by conserving ignorance in its very logic—it ignores the *possibility* of what it is ignorant of. This is the principle of conservation of ignorance without acknowledging it or what can be called the 'deficit of ignorance-awareness'. The principle of conservation-without-acknowledgement is the functional model of an epistemically maimed mind; it is a mind that empowers itself by choosing to operate on the basis of accumulated and well-stabilized information and in so doing, turning 'what it knows' into a blind spot against 'what it doesn't'. In such a scenario, further generation of knowledge equals further degeneration of the mind and its epistemic incapacitation. No mind by itself has a defensive mechanism against the 'epistemic maiming' inflicted by its own

spatiotemporal approach to truth and information. It is for this reason that only deep skepticism, or at least its undergirding strategies, can save the mind from its self-inflicted epistemic maiming.

From a navigational perspective, any past-situated account of truth that reinforces the dogma of 'knowing more equals trusting more in the truth what we know' suffers from a unipathic structure or navigational uniqueness. It is unipathic since in order to preserve truth, it must maximally stabilize the transit of truth values by ignoring any other possible path that might invalidate the preserved truth. But the game of navigation endorses no unique path, not only it is multipathic but also it leaves no address or path taken in the past itinerary unchanged. Its ramifying structure includes not only what ought to be navigated (the consequent content of the commitment), it also encompasses what has already been navigated (the antecedent commitments or the premises of the commitment as such). In other words, in the game of navigation ramification is universal and it is this universality that keeps knowledge in the permanent state of agitation—a landscape with a shifting scenery or a transitory ontology upon which no foundation or navigational preconception can be imposed.

Whereas the unipathicity of truth-preservation is secured by ignoring possible or hypothetical navigational paths or transits, the principle of deep skepticism is equipped with a tentative rationalism required for deviating from the unipathic navigational approach so as to be able to activate and acknowledge the condition of ignorance and respectively mitigate it. This is the underlying logic of non-monotonic reasoning in which ramification of every qualitatively organized site of information into cascading paths generates a universal revisionary wave that perpetually reassess and alter any conclusion reached or information organized. According to the monotonic structure of unipathicity, the increase in the qualitatively organized information—in the form of premises or axioms—results in the increase in theorems (i.e. further establishment of the known). But the non-monotonic structure of navigation as a ramifying procedure does not permit such a symmetry between 'to know' and 'the known'. This is but the navigational reformulation of deep skepticism in which <u>'to know' does not necessarily make any positive difference in 'the known qua the accumulated knowledge'</u>. Under the condition of non-monotonicity, addition of new premises fundamentally revises the old conclusions.

Deep skepticism accordingly is the sharpening of the defeasibility inherent to non-monotonicity in the realm of the mind itself. It suggests that all insights of the mind into the inner workings of the world must be deviated or rendered defeasible by the insights of the mind into its own inner workings while at the same time, all insights of the mind into its inner workings must be deviated by the insights into the workings of the world which condition the workings of the mind.

The erasure of the obvious qua the blind spot in all its forms is only possible by radically disturbing the equilibrium and breaking the symmetric relation between 'knowing' and 'the already known'. The concomitant scrutinizing of the world by looking into the mind and inquiring into the mind by looking into the world constitute the navigational attitude of deep skepticism as adopted by philosophy. It is in this sense that rather than being an impediment, deep skepticism becomes a catalyst for the expansion of knowledge and the evolution of the mind since it

perpetually set frees the game of navigation from its foundationalist commitments, blind spots and navigational pre-conceptions. For knowledge neither requires a foundation nor a positive differential relation between 'knowing' and 'the known' in order to expand its frontiers.

According to the skeptical current of philosophy, it is the truth of the acquired knowledge that occasions the blind spot against the truth of future of knowledge. The unipathic approach to truth establishes a model of mind as a self-reinforcing vicious circle blind to the progressive impoverishment of its own capacities. In reality, the more it knows the less it knows because the more of the new is nothing but the more of the same. Once the old or obtained knowledge is established as a regulative foundation—a matter of belief—all it produces is more of the same. It only reproduces itself qua foundation. It is the parochial loop of 'the more we know the more should we trust in what we know' that fuels the skeptical revenge of philosophy. However, in order to inhibit the conversion of knowledge into belief and more importantly, in order to prevent the entrenchment of unipathicity, philosophy adopts two strategies. As we shall see beneath the surface character of these strategies lies a different mode of adaptation to the reality of time as the chronic truth of philosophy:

Strategy 1:

Rather than assuming that truth is in the past—the obtained knowledge—philosophy dislodges the site of truth from the past—the origin and what has already taken place—to the future. If truth is characterized by its spatiotemporal site in the game of navigation, then to identify truth with what has already taken place or the past is both a metaphysical bias against the reality of time and a logical dogma against the site of truth. As we argued, the consequences of this logical dogma is the epistemic maiming of the mind.

By permanently moving the site of truth to the future where (1) there is no accumulation of empirical footprint (hence, unshackling truth from empirical dogmatism) and (2) from which the reality of time is expressed as the asymmetry and the excess of destinations over the origin, philosophy introduces a new outlook on moving through history. Moving from the past to the future either as a result of privileging what has already taken place (the origin over destinations, a deeper foundation over a broader evolution) or as a result of proceeding from the historical truth situated in the past is the very condition of the unipathic structure and the monotonic logic.

By endorsing the bias that we must proceed from the site of accumulated information and under the general condition of preserving the invariant traits of this spatial, temporal, causal or epistemic accumulation, unipathicity and monotonicity turn the conventional model of history as the path from the past toward the future into a disabling condition for the evolution of the mind in the broadest possible sense. To think along this path is to integrate the principle of conservation of ignorance-without-acknowledgement within the very logic of socio-historical development as a different realization of the mind. The blindness of the mind toward its own progressive incapacitation is reinscribed at the level of historical processes where the historical development is increasingly drained of its possibilities of action and understanding. Thinking on history in this

sense becomes tantamount to the maiming of the mind insofar as the two are tightly integrated via a network of general and specific practices. The unipathicity and monotonicity inherent to an account of history and historical truth realized as the path from the past or the origin toward the future preclude the very possibility of understanding and acting on history as a navigational terrain. And if the navigational structure is the condition of freedom—both epistemic and social—then the unipathic account of history has only very limited resources for a genuine freedom. If the mind in the broadest possible sense evolves not only through but also in response to history which conditions and nourishes it, then without a navigational or exploratory account of history, the evolution of the mind is by default restricted.

An impoverished concept of history leads to an impoverished, epistemically maimed and evolutionary limited mind. The dire socio-political implications of this correlation are yet to be adequately diagnosed particularly because the mind by the virtue of its practical decomposability not only encompasses the cognitive mind but also the mind as an intersubjective social community of norm-consumers and norm-producers. By letting loose its corrosive skepticism against the temporal site of truth and the unipathic-monotonic account of history, philosophy points to a navigational account of history. According to this navigational account, the revisionary import of the future-situated truth becomes a basis for the cultivation of the tendencies of the past, with the present being the site where the effects of revision and cultivation become manifest. Only a politics informed by this exploratory or navigational account of history is capable of unbinding the prospects of the mind in the broadest possible sense and thereby, unlocking hidden abilities of the mind as a socio-historical and practice-based project.

Lacking a navigational concept of history, to think in terms of historical development (whether through dialectical materialism or fatalism of technological singularity) is to further widen the deficit of ignorance-awareness at the level of history. It is this gaping deficit that manifests as descriptive and explanatory impoverishment with regard to historical processes. The immediate expression of this descriptive-explanatory impoverishment is the prescriptive inconsequentiality concerning how possibly we can act on history. All one can hope for is either the feeble resignation in favor of the ordinary—the poor man's *Gelassenheit*—or tecnocapitalist defeatism, if not just trifling exercises in localist solutions. It is under this impoverishing model of history that Marxism today has attributes of a fear-mongering cult and Marxists feel more at home to self-identify themselves as the Brothers Grimm of cautionary tales rather forces of the future. In order to reopen Marxism to the future without eliciting a pathological eschatology, it is necessary to have a navigational and commitment-oriented model of history not only to broaden the scope of action and understanding but also to explore various possibilities of reciprocal influence between history and the evolution of the mind in the broadest possible sense.

What the knowing subject should be afraid of is what it already knows not what it doesn't. In the same fashion, what the collective subject should be wary of is the knowledge of history as the knowledge of the past and action solely in accordance with this knowledge. Because whether it manifests as an implicitly or explicitly temporal register, the background knowledge is susceptible to being a locus of epistemic disablement. Just as knowledge is a mode of navigation, history at its base is the exploration of time. Navigation or exploratory procedures

are only possible in multipathic environments. For this reason, they are incompatible with unipathicity, be it a unipathic horizon of knowledge or a unipathic account of history for which the historical link is always extended from the past qua origin. This is because in unipathic environments, prospects of action and understanding are limited to options which are strongly in conformity with the accumulated resources of knowledge insofar as they are constrained to preserve the truth-values of an overdetermining informational organization. But this preservation is always at the cost of either actively ignoring or being passively blind to possible alternative paths or modes of organization. This is why unipathic links in history are distinctly impoverished, both from the perspective of their epistemic purchase and their capacity for action and organization. Short on epistemic insight and facilities for organizing action, the unipathic history in which the present should preserve the origin or is either epistemically or socially anchored in the past is destitute of the possibility of any genuine change. In the unipathic history, any genuine change is always perceived in the form of a disruption or an irruption occasion by the suppression of alternatives. It is in this sense, that both the Landian technocapitalist singularity and Meillassoux's absolute contingency and scientific messianism (if not also, the Badiousian event) are the same expressions of an exceptionally impoverished or unipathic account of history. Since both the mind and philosophy essentially have histories, the impoverishment of history translates into nothing other than the destitution of thought and the retardation of the mind's evolution as the unity of its meaning and realization.

Strategy 2:

Rather than concluding what has been obtained and putting it to rest, philosophy attempts to—by any means possible—prevent its acquired knowledge-bases from settling. In other words, it fashions a new model of knowledge in which knowledge is far from being concluded, not only because there is a future knowledge to be acquired but also because the past knowledge must perpetually undergo transition without ever being concluded. In other words, the perpetual and permanent state of agitation essential to the navigational paradigm of knowledge requires a new abstraction of time according to which knowledge should remain inconclusive both in the past and in the future. Edgeless is time so as the edifice of knowledge. Just as time does not privilege temporal density for such privileging is a metaphysical bias, so does knowledge refuse to endorse any specific temporal density of information for to do otherwise is to conspire the crime of faith in the name of knowledge.

The philosophical diagnosis is roughly like this: The structure of knowledge as decided by unipathicity and monotonicity is deep down determined by a specific abstraction of time as characterized by uniqueness and chronological orientation from the past qua the origin toward the future. If the accumulation and production of knowledge is spatially structured according to the abstraction of temporal ordering, then abstraction of time has a direct and decisive role in how knowledge-bases can be organized, accessed or updated. Biased or restrictive abstractions of time respectively distort the epistemic activities of the mind, limit the

manipulability and access to knowledge-bases and abnormally constrain the space of possibilities for actions.

Deficit of ignorance-awareness, canonicity of truth and navigational blind spots stem from distortions implicit in metaphysically biased abstractions of time. Now in order to mitigate these disabling conditions in the production of knowledge and the evolution of the mind, the abstraction of time specific to the structure of unipathicity and the logic of monotonicity <u>must be countered with a new abstraction of time</u>. Philosophy has a solution for this: it integrates this new abstraction of time directly within the procedure of commitment-making that drives it, the revisionary stance that cultivates it and the principle of deep skepticism that allows it to corrode any metaphysical or logical foundation even that of its own. In order to enter the game of navigation in earnest, an abstraction of time compatible with the revisionary compulsion of the navigational paradigm, its non-monotonicity, multipathicity (ramified paths) and the asymmetry between the content of commitments and their initial premises must be developed. In its commitment to expand the functional evolution of the mind in the broadest possible sense and fulfilling the criteria of the game of navigation, <u>philosophy thinks time backwards</u>. This is the abstraction of time that philosophy endorses.

But in order to think time backwards, it is necessary to break the structure of reflectivity provided by the unipathic structure of the time from the past qua origin toward the future. Reflection in this sense is the backward thinking of time, not thinking time backwards. It still employs a reverse arrow of time but through a conception of the present that preserves the past, either under the heading of empirical-causal priorities (*first come*, *more real*) or a reflexively recuperated history. Philosophy on the other hand think times backwards not from the present looking back at the past, but from multiple destinations in the future arriving in the past. If the reality of time is freely expressed by the asymmetry and excess of future destinations over the origin and its discontinuity to what has already taken place, then in thinking time backwards from the future to the past philosophy mimics the very structure of time.

The mimicking of time introduces philosophy as a thought procedure fully adapted to the reality of time. It sees every concept from the perspective of its ramified paths, every commitment from the revisionary viewpoint of its future ramifications, the functional space of ought as a force that reconstitutes and interferes with its causal space or 'what it is'. In this fashion, philosophy more than just proposing that the history should be explored according to 'what things ought to be' rather 'what they are', offers a true interventive account of history by suggesting that the order of ought has the capacity to alter the order of is. It is in the light of the latter that philosophy uncovers history as the proper environment for the emergence of functional autonomy and a self-realizing account of intelligence as the link between reason and freedom consolidated in the game of navigation.

A history that is incapable of altering its contingent constitution is not history, it is only nature replete with the order of 'is'. It is according to such a distinction that philosophy sees the mind as what has a history rather than a nature because it is capable of reconstituting its causal natural order and thus, realizing itself outside of mere teleology or causal optimization prevalent

in nature. History begins with the gesticulation of a disequilibrium that enables a deviation from nature's order of ends. In this sense, history's order of ends is not simply the extension of nature's ends. If possession of a self-constituting history is the yardstick of freedom, by bequeathing the mind a history rather than a nature, philosophy sets out for the most consequential event in the history of thought. This is the self-realization of the mind as the organon of freedom. But once the mind is furnished with a history capable of reconstituting itself and interfering with its own contingently posited settings, its freedom takes shape as its multiple realizability—that is, the possibility of the realization of 'what counts as the mind' in different contexts, by different means and for different purposes. This is the characteristics of creatures-endowed-with-history: what they will be is not the extension what they currently are or what they have been, for what they will be is conceived from what they take themselves as what they ought to be not what they are. They are parts of a future that writes its own past.

The mind—as a set of practices whose parallel execution and functional integration count as 'what the mind is'—can be implemented not only by different physical substrates but also by different modes of organization and communities of rational agencies. But this is not an unconstrained account of multiple realizability that (erroneously) suggests infinite functional equivalents of the mind or its thoroughgoing diffusion in everything. Simply put, it does not suggest that the mind can be realized by everything or any material-organizational substrate. Here the multiple realizability is constrained by the realism of history. In other words, the realizability of the mind as a practical project is under constraints and specificities set by history in the context of contingencies, local exigencies, how social practices can be organized or what they consist in, etc. Succinctly speaking, it is multiply realizable to the extent that it is multiply constrained.

To think time backwards from the future to the past is to think mind as having a self-constituting history rather than a nature. To furnish mind with a history that can simultaneously be cultivated and revised is to envisage the mind as the very implement of freedom. Yet even more, to think the mind as the organon of freedom is to explore the possibilities of realizing the mind by different modes of organization and for different purposes, or more precisely, for different oughts. A mind capable of exploring the possibilities of its own reconstruction and multiple realizability is indeed a self-realizing mind. The evolution of a self-realizing mind suggests its functional expansion and organizational diversification. This is a mind that at different times and with different emphases has been introduced under different names: the nous, the spirit's odyssey, the augmented intellect or the self-apprehending general intelligence.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

The advent of rational technologies as a communal domain of practices, epistemic and social abstraction, and organization of rational agencies has set the stage for the implementation of general intelligence in the social organization and its struggles, rather than physical materials or digital systems. Far before computer networks, the open-source of the self-realizing intelligence was the social space of rational intentional agents as essentially functionalist entities. To reestablish the historical social processes and organizations as the open-source and the

bootstrapping medium of a self-apprehending intelligence is a massively demanding and laborious project, but one whose objectives coincide with the meaning and realization of a consequential politics. Folding augmented intelligence back into politics by way of social realization, this is the ultimate aim of the project of self-realization highlighted by the history of philosophy. It is in the light of the project of self-realization at the intersection of politics and artificial general intelligence that we can finally pose the following question: <u>What is it to take, treat and construct a society or a civilization as an artificial mind or a vector of self-apprehending intelligence?</u>

The exploratory implications of a self-apprehending intelligence conceived as the link between normative freedom and reason as a set of methodologically collectivizing practices are vast. Yet to this day, such implications are far from evident if not largely unknown. The first step to even begin to think the scope of such a project and its staggering consequences is to design—following the path of Chinese New Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan—a two-tier ontology of the mind, a navigational system known as *a mind with two gates*. A door opening inward to the cognitive mind and a door opening outward to the mind as a self-cultivating project of collective socio-historical practices. To grasp the reinforcing and expanding loop between cognitive-based practices of the former and social techniques of the latter (the practices of collective self-cultivation) is the true and main objective of the game of navigation once it is reenacted on the level of history.

By building the principle of deep skepticism into its thinking of time, philosophy brings about the possibility of thinking history outside of the myth of redemption, outside of the reconciliation between thinking and being, and restoration of the gap between 'is' and 'ought'. Thinking history as not what it is but as what it ought to be, thinking mind not in terms of what constitutes it but progressively in terms of a history of reconstitutions. Through the lens of such an account of history, intelligence can no longer be understood or cultivated by responding to the question of 'what is intelligence?' Its open prospects for reconstruction and evolution can only be approached through an understanding that appeals to the normative functional side of intelligence or the question of 'what ought intelligence to be?' once posed under a navigational paradigm.

To have a history is to have the ability to navigate in such a way that the consequences of making one normative move (making a commitment) unfold as future ramifying paths. Taking these paths is the very content of the commitment whose practical elaboration not only uproots the current position in the landscape but also fundamentally changes the travel history and the address of the past itinerary. In this fashion, philosophy's ambition to examine the history of the mind under the direction of theoretical and practical wisdoms turns into a navigation of cognitive-based and social-based practices whose integration and synthesis define meaning of the mind. But as argued earlier, there is no understanding of a functional system without constructing it, there is no exploration of the history of the mind that is not in reality the exploration of possibilities of realizing the mind by different means and in different contexts. Philosophy's gesture to understand the mind in terms of its practical decomposability is but the

very gesture that sets in motion the project of the mind as navigation of collective rule-based practices and how they can be organized.

But in order for philosophy to be a guiding gesture for the history of the mind and social intelligence, philosophy must first refashion itself as the very model of intelligence it aspires to realize. Indeed by thinking time backwards from multiple destinations in the future toward the past, by committing to navigate the domain of concepts, by constructing a history for itself rather than nature and by approaching this history at the juncture of the most perennial questions for creatures-endowed-with-history ('what should we think?' and 'what should we do?'), philosophy presents itself as a simulation of a self-apprehending intelligence. Whereas the fact-oriented nature of scientific revision forever changes or abandons the concepts of the past (such as the god-given notion of life, geocentricity or phlogiston), philosophy never gives up rewriting its own past. It is the very force of thought that arrives back from the future to target its past resources in order to liberate its present condition.

Just as philosophy cultivates itself by rewriting its own past, a mind accustomed to philosophy is a mind scheming its own liberation from whoever thinks it. If the first task of the philosopher is to recognize the freedom of a mind that is not hers and to explore the ramifications of this recognition to the fullest extent, then why not imagine and struggle for a mind—a collective augmented intelligence—that while everyone contributes to its self-realization, it refuses to belong to anyone, not even the specific history that constitutes it.